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INTRODUCTION
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID" or the "Centre") is one of the five
organizations of the World Bank ("WB"), the specialized agency
of the United Nations, whose mandate includes promoting
development of member states by facilitating the investment of
capital for productive purposes. Nearly fifty years ago, the
World Bank formulated the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States ("ICSID Convention" or the "Convention") and
established the Centre; today, its membership includes 147
states: Obscure to development specialists, ICSID is well known
to international law scholars as well as lawyers who practice in
the growing field of investor-state arbitration.
The ICSID Convention is best known as an administrative
treaty. It establishes ICSID's secretariat and a methodology for
appointing decision-makers, contemplates the creation of
uniform procedural rules, and provides administrative support
for disputes involving investors and states under international
investment agreements ("HAs") and foreign investment laws.
The Centre sits in Washington, D.C. and shares administrative
resources and infrastructure with the WB. The Administrative
Council is the Centre's governing body, and the President of the
WB is the ex officio Chairman of the ICSID Administrative
1. Convention on the Settlement of Investment )isputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270. 575
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. The five organizations of the World
Bank ("W1B") group are: International Finance Corporation ("IFC"), Multilateral
Investment Guarantec Agency ("MIGA"), International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development ("IBRD"), International Development Associaion (IDA"), and
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID").
2. List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention as ofJuly 25, 2012,
INTLRNATIONAL CLNTRL FOR SETTLLMLNT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTLS.
http://icsid.worldbank.org/I(Il) (follow "Member States" hyperlink; then follow
"List of Contracting States" hyperlink; then follow "English" hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 10, 2013).
3. Antonio Parra, The Development of the Regulations and Rales of the International
Centre for Settlement ofInvestment Disputes, 22 ICSID RLV.-FoRLIGN iNVLSTMENT L.J. 1, 55-
56 (2007) (describing the creation of ICSID, the drafting of the ICSID Convention, and
its rules and regulations).
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Council.4 Until very recently the General Counsel of the WB was
also the head or Secretary-General of ICSID.5
The signing of the ICSID Convention and the creation of
the Centre are important milestones in the development of
international law. However, legal scholarship tends to evaluate
the organization as an international adjudicatory body ignoring
the complexity of its mandate and domain. Not only did the
Convention give origin to an international organization
specialized in international investment disputes settlement, but
it also facilitated the expansion of a formal system of protections
for foreign investors based on a remedy for damages directly
enforceable by individuals or corporations against states. More
importantly, the Convention and the Centre served to promote
a particular understanding of the role of foreign direct
investment ("FDI") in national economic development, to
stabilize a vision of economic cooperation, and to advance-
especially, after the Soviet collapse-an idea of the rule of law
often embedded in the agenda of the organizations of the WB.6
The current academic commentary regarding ICSID
focuses on doctrinal and procedural analysis of its arbitration
process.7 While interdisciplinary and empirical scholarship is
rapidly emerging, " some addressing fundamental issues
4. Organizational Structure ofjlCSID, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTEs, http://icsid.worldbank.org/I(SID (follow "About ICSID"
hyperlink; then follow "Organizational Structure" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 24,
2012).
5. Damon Vis-Dunbar, Meg Kinnear Elected SecretaN-General of ICSID, INVESTMENT
TREATY NEWS (Mar. 3, 2009), http: //vvw.iisd.org/ itn/ 2009/03/03/ rneg-kinnear-
eketed-as-secretary-general-of-icsid; see generally IBRAHTM H. SHIHATA, THE WORLD
BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS AND LECTURES (1995).
6. See generally Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's ses of the "Rule of Law" Promis i
Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVILOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 253, 253-83 (David M. Trubck & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
7. See Torn Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L 1. 1335,
1340 (2003) (describing the convergence of various arbitration practices). Professor
Ginsburg argues that this may be rooted in the fact that in this field of law, "perhaps
more than any other field of law, the line between scholar and practitioner is blurred
so that many leading scholars are involved in arbitrations, and many lcading arbitrators
take the time to write academic articles and books" about investment law and
arbitration. Id. at 1340.
8. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in
Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INTIL L. 825 832 (2011) [hereinafter Franck, ICS1D Effect]
(arguing that ICSID can and should be a model of fairness, efficiency, and justice in
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concerning ICSID, 'this scholarship makes little effort to
disentangle the complexity of the institution and the concrete
articulation of its different goals. 10 More importantly, no
agreement seems to exist among scholars and practitioners on
the different baselines that should be used to evaluate ICSID's
claimed effectiveness.
This gap is problematic for several reasons. For one, it
allows commentators to evaluate ICSID in multiple, frequently
incoherent ways. Without a conceptual framework, many
assessments of ICSID rely on the concept of "legitimacy" as an
organizing principle. In numerous contexts, including when an
arbitral tribunal or annulment committee hands down a
controversial decision, when a party ignores a decision, or when
a recalcitrant country withdraws its consent, ICSID's legitimacy
"crisis" is invoked.II Multiple shortcomings of ICSID are cited in
such evaluations, but the focus is generally on legal legitimacy.12
the Held of international economic dispute resolution and that ICSID should minimize
concerns about lkgitimacy and maximize opportunities for equality).
9. Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral ITetmen t Treaties Promote Foreign Direct
Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397, 398 (2010)
(questioning whether bilateial investment treatics "work").
10. Se Susan ). Firanci , The Legitimacy Osis in Invetme nt Treaty Arbitration:
Pivatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1521, 1547-48 (2005) [hereinafter Fianck, Legitimacy Crsis] (noting the possibility of
inconsistent ICSID awards).
11. See, e.g., George Kahale 111. Is Investor-State Arbitration Broken? 7 TRANSNAT'L
DisP. MGMT. (Dec. 2012), available at www.transnational-dispute-
management.con/article.asp]key 1918 (characterizing ICSID and investment
arbitration as a broken system); Gabriel Bottini, Should Arbitrators Live on Mars?
Challenge ofArbitrators in Investment Arbitration, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. RLV. 341, 341
(2009) ("Legitimacy of investment arbitration is becoming one of the main concerns of
all the institutions and persons involved in the process."); W. Mark C. Weidenaicr,
Dsputing Boilerplate, 82 TLMP. L. RLV. 1, 18-19 (2009) (noting that many governments
claim that ICSID has a bias towards foreign investors).
12. See David D. Caron, Investor-State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical Perspectives on
Legitimacy, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNATL L. REV. 513, 514-15 (2009) (observing that
although several critiques relate to concerns of proc edural legitimacy, substantive
justice is also key); William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liabiity
Uder BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INTL HLALTH L. &
POL'Y 199, 222-23 (2008) (suggesting that ICSID's legitimacy depends upon
substantive outcomes); VWilliam W. Burkc-W "hite & Andreas von Stadcn, Investment
Protection in Elxtraordinar Times. The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded
Aeasures Proisions i Bilaterl Inve(stment Teaties, 48 VA.J. INTIL L. 307, 373-74 (2008)
(suggesting that ICSID lcgitimacy could be enhanced by substantive changes affecting
Outcome, particularly the incorporaLion of an interpretive "margin of apprcciation");
Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora's Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitratio, 101
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Most commonly, the focus on whether ICSID (or the panels
constituted under its rules) acted within its original mandate
and jurisdictional limit or to what extent state members
complied with the Convention.'
This treatment of ICSID's assessment as a heated legitimacy
debate complicates the analysis and policy recommendations
and serves as a distraction from objective evaluations of the
different goals of the institution. 14 Regardless of whether
scholars are critical or sympathetic towards the institution,
because different analyses often entail different conceptual
constructions of ICSID's role and functions, the analyses shape
contradictory assessments and diverse, often conflicting, policy
recommendations. At the same time, the lack of agreement on a
framework seems to enable ICSID to ignore important criticism
and rely on complacent empirics in its response to the same.'1
This work sketches a framework for assessing ICSID by
asking the following question: how shall scholars assess if ICSID
is an effective tool for international governance? It argues that
ICSID should not be assessed solely on the basis of effects as an
international adjudicatory body. Based on the goals externally
defended by the institution, instead, the Article proposes a
larger construction of this international organization that leads
to three large areas for empirical investigations. For this
purpose, the Ar ticle uses insights from international law,
AM. J. INT'L L. 711, 723 (2007) ("Legitimacy of ICSID arbitral awards depends on
respecting this adjudicatory mission . . . ."); Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICS1D Appellate
Bod,. 10 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 179. 202 (2005) (cautioning that, even as a matter
of substance, there can be legitimacy challenges even if the "right" substantive result is
reached through the "wrong" reasoning).
13. Adnittedly, this is not unique to ICSID comimntary; lgal scholars prefer to
analyze the fascinating intricacies of a given field's doctrine and hermeneutics or
specific norn compliance than to conduct empirical analysis on goal-based
effectiveness. Cf Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of Lnternational Courts: A Goal-
Based Approach, 106 AM.J. INT'l L. 225, 225-29 (2012) (suggesting questions to be used
in assessing the performance of international courts).
14. See Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration,
50 HARV. INT'L . 435, 437-38 (2009) (summarizing the legitimacy debate and
arguing that kegitimacy "concerns are motivated by apprehension about arbitration's
potential disparate impact on the developing world and fear that deveelopment status
might inappropriately affect outcome."); see generally Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra
note 10 (suggesting Inethods for promoting legitimacy in international arbitration).
15. See ICSID, 2011 A NNLAL RLPORT 6 (2011) [hereinafter ICSID 2011 REPORT]
(arguing that the institution "takes pride in being a leader in the field").
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international organizations, and legal theory and relies on the
official writings of Ibrahim F. 1. Shihata, the longest-serving
Secretary-General (1983-2001) and ICSID's most effective
promoter. " Shihata's knowledge and understanding of the
organization's mandate allowed him to set a programmatic
agenda, as well as to propose ways to assess the organization's
tridimensional role.1
Before proceeding a cautionary note is in order: this Article
does not attempt to address the question of what makes ICSID,
international organizations, or adjudicative bodies legitimate.
Rather, my main interest in this Article is to develop a research
agenda for an interdisciplinary approach toward studying
ICSID's effectiveness. To achieve a conversation across
disciplines, this Article adopts the dominant definition of
effectiveness in the social science literature, which offers a
straightforward formulation: an organization is effective if it
accomplishes its specific objective aims."' Consequently, in order
to gauge the effectiveness of an institution using this approach
one has to identify the organization's origins, goals, and the
different criteria to perform the assessment.
Similarly, when relying on the term "legitimacy," in this
Article I use the concept of sociological legitimacy and not the
traditional concept of legal legitimacy. 1 i "Whereas the
sociological perspective implies an external [functional] and
relational dimension, a legal perspective implies an internal or
intra-institutional point of view based on the logical analysis and
comparison between . . . rules and the principles that govern
16. Charles N. Brower, Ibrahim Shihata and the Resolution ofInternational It etment
Disputes The Masterful Missionary. 31 STUD. TRASNAT'L LLGAL POLY 79, 79 (1999)
("Shihata raised [ICSID] almost from infancy, through adolescence, to its present
young, but rapidly maturing, adulthood.").
17. See ICSID, 1984 ANNUAL RLPORT 8 [hereinafter ICSID 1984 RLPORT].
18. see jEFFREY PFEFFER, ORGANIZATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS THEORY 41 (1982);
see also Janes L. Price, The Study of Organizational Effectiveness, 13 Soc. Q. 3, 3-7 (1972)
(describing the "goal approach" as the "traditional way to study effectiveness").
19. For a discussion on the distinctions between legal, sociological, and moral
legitimacy see Richard Fallon, Legitimtacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. RL. 1787,
1791 (2005) (noting the "increased understanding of constitutional dcbates, enhanced
precision of thought, and the potential for clearer expression"); Craig McEwen &
Richard Maiman, In Search of Legitimacy: Toward an Empirical Analysis, 8 L.w & POL'Y
257, 257 (1986) (relying on the term legitimacy from a straightforward concept of
sociological legitimacy for empirical analy sis of courts).
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it." 20 The sociological perspective allows us to take ICSID's
external goals at face value and to see ICSID as an organization
working to pursue a very specific mandate with desired
outcomes that it ought to generate.2' After all, as put simply by
ICSID's own Secretary-General, ICSID is an organization
"dedicated to serving the public good."2
The Article begins with a brief discussion of the intellectual
justifications and political, economic and legal ideas behind the
creation of ICSID. It continues with a main analysis that unpacks
these same three different justifications for the maintenance of
the Centre. The Article concludes by surveying the main
critiques formulated against ICSID in order to recast a
legitimacy debate grounded on the empirically testable
underpinnings of the organization's goals. When seen through
the lens of the three proposed sources, the evaluation of the
effectiveness of the institution reveals important challenges but
also enormous possibilities for future research.
I. ORIGIN.- LAWT POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS
To some extent, most post-World War 11 economic
institutions are the product of a historical convergence of the
following types of ideas: post-enlightenment, rationalist, secular,
Western, modern, and capitalist.23 These particular forms of
thought are linked to a specific conception of the relationships
between "law, politics, and economics." 24 These ideas are
20. Alba Ruibal. The Sociological Concept offudicial Legitimacy: Notes ofLatin American
Constitutonal Courts, 3 MEX. I. REV. 343, 346 (2010). For an example of an empirical
assessment of sociological kegitimacy see James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira. The
Legitimac of Transnational Legal Institutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court
ofJutice, 39 AM. J. POL. SC. 459, 471-77 (1995) (measuring the legitimacy of the
European Court of Justice based on diffuse support, acceptance of court decisions, and
perceptions of procedural justice).
21. Cf Ruibal supra note 20 at 348-50 (describing criticisms of Weber's theory of
legitimacy).
22. ICSID 2011 RLPORT, supra note 15. at 6.
23. See David W. Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the
Problen? 15 HARV. HLM. RTs.J. 101. 114 (2001) (citing western Enlightenment views
that are critical of the human rights movement as including "animal pre-exists the
human, faith pre-exists reason, the feudal pre-exists the modern" just as "the economy
pre-exists politics, politics pre-exists law, and the private pre-exists the public").
24. While there are of course other analogous forms of [hought Lhat form tihe
foundation to similar institutions and their regimes, those are not discussed here
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inspired in the Power-Grounded and Natural State theories of
Hobbes that see social structures and legal orders as bids to limit
pervasive self-help.25
The architects of the post-war international economic
system set out to establish an ambitious framework for
international cooperation.2 Prospects of peace and prosperity
were linked to the success of multilateral organizations that
could serve as forums for negotiation, as guardians of the rules
governing these interactions, and as an attempt to centralize
coercive force.27 This reflected the perception of the Allied
planners of the post-war world as a post-enlightened economic
community of nations.28 As explained by Robert Howse, the
because the focus is on the historical moment in which these post-war institutions were
born. Id. at 114-15.
25. See generally QUENTIN SKINNER, REASON ANTD RHETORIC IN THE PHIL OSOPHY OF
THOMAS HOBBES (1996); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. L ch. 13 (Edwin Curley ed.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1994) (165 1); Edwin M. Borchard, Limitations on Coercive Protection,
21 AM.J. INT'. L. 303, 303 (1927) (noting that "an injury to a member is an inury to
his entire clan").
26. The agreement on the creation of international financial organizations,
mainly the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the World Bank, was reached on
July 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. In the trade arena, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") was concluded after the failure of the
International Trade Organization; it would be fifty years until the international
community succeeded in creating the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). In
addition, more than 2,600 International Investment Treaties have been concluded
since 1945 between developed and developing countries (and between developed
countries inter se), mostly similar in content, providing for the security of foreign
investment (and generally investment-arbitration dispute resolution mechanisms). See
Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties:
Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM.J. INT'L L. 48, 48 (2008) (noting that
in international law, WTO governs trade and mvestment treaties govern investment).
27. Kathlken R. McNamara, The Institutional Dilemmas of iarket Integration:
Compliance and International Regimes for Trade and Finance in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ORGANIZATION: CLOSING THE COIPITANCE GAP 41, 52 (Edward C. Luck & Michael W.
Doyle eds., 2004) (characterizing the International Monetary Fund as the "key
institution for the regulation of international financial matters."). See generally Chris
Brummer, How International Financial Law W1orks (And How It Doesn't), 99 GEO. L.J. 257,
261 (2011) ("In contrast to areas like international trade. financial agreements do not
take the form of legally binding treatics. Instead, international financial rules are
promulgated mainly through nonbinding agreements. This informal quality helps spur
agreement between countries by limiting the risks of often uncertain costs and benefits
accompanying the adoption of any regulatory standard.").
28. The architects of the post-war settlement saw the nineteenth century as a time
of relatively open trade, and of peace, in contrast to the first half of the twentieth
century, which was a time of high tariffs. discriminatory economic arrangements,
import quotas, unilateralism and bilateralism. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORi)
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Bretton Woods System was: "[C]oncerned with the
interdependency of different states' trade and other economic
policies-i.e., managing or constraining the external costs that
states impose on other states by virtue of their policies." 2
The Bretton Woods arrangements embedded the idea of
interdependency, integration and macro-economic planning."
To achieve this integration-founders argued-the relationship
of property with sovereignty should resemble a system in which
anybody, whatever her nationality, could participate in
transnational economic exchanges. For this to happen it was
necessary " [t] o diminish national sovereignty . . . instead of
being transferred to a higher political and geographical unit."
In this new setting, managing the external costs imposed on
states necessitated international rule and decision-making
processes.
In addition to the political and economic foundations
described briefly above, a dialogue between two distinct legal
conceptions riding high at that time also informed the
organization's foundations.b On the one hand, legal positivism
-whose adherents included mostly European civil law
scholars-argued for the separation of law and morality and
considered the law as being posited by lawmakers. 4 On the
TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 31-73
(1997).
29. Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the
Multilatera Trading Regine, 96 AM.J. INT'II 1. 94, 94-95 (2002) (emphasis in original)
(adding that this was the case "to avoid exporting destructive forms of intcrdependent
behav ior").
30. Id. at 95.
31. Wilhelm Ropke, Economic Order and International Law, 86 REcuEiL )FS COU RS
203, 250 (1954) (describing the diminishment of national sovereignty as "one of the
urgent needs of [the] time").
32. Internationalist scholars view deeper delegation as the main feature in the
legalization of international economic law. This feature is also sometimes blamed for
what it is called a -fragmentation" process of international law. Se generally Study Grp.
of the Intl1 Law Conn'n, Frlagmentation oflnternational Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion ofl ternational La, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13,
2006) (noting both positive and negative sides of the development of more
mechanisms to apply international law).
33. See Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Conmercial Law. 55 S. ECON.
644, 645-47 (1989) (distinguishing between legal positivists, from natural law
theorists in the context of understanding the dcvelopment of connercial law).
34. See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. RFV. 593, 599 (1958) (defending legal positivism from critics); Stanley L.
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other hand, natural law theory presented in a secularized form-
whose theorists developed largely out of the common law
tradition (which historically resisted the separation of morality
and law)-was an eloquent champion of legal processes and
institutional order as essential components of a market-based
society.15 Under both traditions, the law serves an important
coordinative function by providing a framework against which
individuals might orientate actions as well as rationally evaluate
interactions with others. "
These two conceptions of law (legal positivism and
secularized naturalism) dominated Western legal jurisprudence
in the 1960s. Inspired by H. L. Hart and the legal philosophy of
Lon L. Fuller, and profoundly located within classical
liberalism's traditional emphasis of liberty and freedom, these
conceptions permeated the creation of modern transnational
legal institutions. 7 Among other consequences, legal institutions
experienced a process of assimilation of instrumentalism and
formalism. In its final analysis it meant that international legal
orders were not only the way to subject human conduct to the
governance of legitimate rules, but also to limit evil regimes
from implementing substantially unjust laws that curtail liberty.
Individual rights represented a form of empowerment to
liberate the individual from the state's subjugation, as well as to
enable direct enforcement of such substantive ends of the law. "
Paulson, Four Phases in Hans Kelsens Legal Theory? Reflections on a Periodization, 18
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 153 (1998) (identifying key claims and evolution of legal
positivism).
35. See LON L. FULLER, THL MORALITY OF LAw 145 (rev. ed. 1969) (" [L] aw [is] ...
a purposelul enterprise, dependent for its success on the energy, insight, intelligence,
and conscientiousness of those who conduct it, and fated, because of this dependence,
to fall always somewhat short of a full attainnient of its goals."); Lon L. Fuller, Reason
and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. RFV. 376 (1946).
36. In secularized individualistic societies, certainty, objectivity and neutrality tend
to be an important constitutive value. See Jermy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of
Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 48 (2008) ("Law in the first sense requires the existence of
certain general norms that serve as a basis of orientation for people's behavior as well
as a basis for decision by the courts.").
37. See David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics oj Global Governance, 27
SYDNLY L. RLV. 5, 19-20 (2005) ("Experts argue for their preferred policy or doctrinal
choice by reference to broader theories, methods and political commitments which
they associate with the doctrine or policy they prefer. For lawyers, these can be theories
of law-positivisn, naturalisn, sociolog .... )
38. This rhetoric not only imakes it hard to assess questions of distribution amiong
favored and less favored rights holders, foreclosing the development of a political
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The result of this process of assimilation was the revival of
international economic law as a procedural functionalist
enterprise with the following features, all of which are
embedded in the ICSID system:
(1) a predominant concern for individual rights and private
property;
(2) laws enforced by the victims backed by reciprocal
agreements;
(3) standard adjudicative procedures established to avoid
violence;
(4) offences treated as torts punishable by economic
restitution;
(5) strong incentives for the guilty to yield to prescribed
punishment due to threat of social ostracism; and
(6) legal change via an evolutionary process of developing
customs and norms.
11. FUNCTION THREE GOAL-BASED CLAIMS
ICSID is yet another example, perhaps even the
poster-child, of international legalization, a phenomenon salient
in international economic relations. 40 As evidenced by the
proliferation of judicial and quasi-judicial institutions, and
considered a positive development in international law by many
legal scholars, such expansion also has been criticized as
ideological in character. 41 Without being exhaustive, what
process for tradeoffs among them, but also the inevitable desideratum of the enterprise
of law as coercion: too many regulations would undermine the law. See MAX WEBER,
LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 188-91 (Max Rhcinstein ed.. Edward Shils & Max
Rheinstein trans., 1967) ("The development of legally regulated relationships ... is
usually regarded as signifying a decrease of constraint and an increase of individual
freedom.").
39. BRU CE I . BENSON, THE ENTERPRTSE OF LAW 21 (1990).
40. For an analysis of the different perspectives on legalization and the theoretical
puzzles that legalization poses for international institutions scc Judith Goldstein ct al..
Introdaction: Legalization and World Politics. 54 INT'L ORG. 385, 386 (2000) ("These
actions, taken in the course of a single year, were representative of a longer tcrm trend:
some international institutions are becoming increasingly legalized.").
41. For a characterization of this practice as part of a broader event in global legal
consciousness, legal reasoning, and legal institutions see Duncan Kennedy, Three
Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in TEIL NLw LAW AND ECO\NOMIC
DFVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL, APPRATSAL 253, 253-83 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos
2013] 475
476 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:465
follows is a brief recounting of some legalization efforts prior to
the creation of ICSID to contextualize the three justificatory
functions claimed by the organization.
A. Background
Prior to the establishment of ICSID, international
investment dispute settlement looked different, and was heavily
dependent on traditionally mercantilist relationships.42 In other
words, in contrast with the current "hybrid," decentralized, and
increasingly privatized system enabled by ICSID, international
adjudication was built around inter-state relations.4 3
Conflicts over the treatment of property of nationals abroad
have existed-at least-since the growing strength of a
bourgeois merchant class in England and the Netherlands
succeeded in the chartering of trade companies for overseas
expansion, in turn giving rise to a mercantilist expansion in the
early seventeenth century.44 Conflicts then were resolved by
some of the methods relied upon today (e.g., negotiation,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication) as well as
some other methods that are no longer permissible under
international law (e.g., armed interventions for the collection of
debts or private letters of reprisals) .45
eds., 2006) (describing a third globalization of legal thought, originating in the United
States, with judges and adjudication as a centerpiece).
42. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Briej History oJ International Investment Agreenents, 12
U.AVISJ. INT'L L & POL'Y 157, 173-75 (2005) (noting that one innovation of ICSID
Convention was the possibility of investor-state arbitration).
43. See generally Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.1. INT'L . 151 (2004) (discussing the choice of law problems
related to jurisdictional conflicts between tribunals established by treaties. and those
constituted pursuant contract).
44. See Anoush Khoshkish, International Law of Investment: An Overview, GLOBAL
POLITICAL ECON. (2012), http://www.globalpoliticaleconoiy.com /ar tintlaw.htmli
("[T]he British East India Company, 1600; the Dutch East India Company, 1602; the
United East India Company (Dutch), 1602; the Dutch West India Company, 1621; and
a number of others which had varying degrees of success depending on the territories
they wvere targeting.")
45. Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the
Recovery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607, art. 1. This was
the first effort to limit the collection of debt by forcible means. While the early
twientieth century prohibition on the use of force to collect debts in the Hague
Conventions was only partial, it represented an important step towards the eventual
prohibition in the United Nations Charter, which is now regarded as a jus cogens under
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Foreign investments were put to international
adjudication-at least-as early as the end of the eighteenth
century, when mixed arbitral commissions under Jay's Treaty of
1794 addressed the settlement of debts to British creditors.46
Since then, Mixed Claims Commissions and ad hoc Tribunals
(e.g., France-Venezuela, Iran-United States, United States-
Germany, or Mexico-United States) developed as an alternative
to a centralized international judicial system. These commissions
expanded until the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
Treaties ("FCNs") started providing for state-to-state dispute
resolution by the International Court of Justice after World War
II*47 Provisions in modern IIAs concerning dispute settlement as
well as national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, the
minimum standard of treatment, and expropriation each have
antecedents in FCNs and nineteenth-century commercial
treaties.
International claims commissions and ad hoc tribunals
dealing with the property of foreigners are the second cousins of
what today is the ICSID system of investment dispute settlement.
These commissions were characterized by an essential state-to-
state mode of adjudication; 48 the establishment of semi-
permanent decision-making bodies with certain levels of
"independency" of their members;49 and consensual third party
adjudication, which many times involved contentious (and
international law. See U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 4 ("All members shall refrain in their
international relatins from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.").
46. Barton Leguin, Federalism, NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the fay TreatY of 1794, 95
AM. SOC. INTL L. PROC. 202 (2001).
47. William S. I)odge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries:
Reflections on the Australia-Lited States Free Trade Agreement 39 VAND.J. TRANSNAT' 1 L.
1. 5-8 (2006) (describing the traditional diplomatic protections available to foreign
investors harmed by breaches of international law).
48. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the Ited
States, 21 CORNELL INTL L.J. 201, 265 (1988) (describing the 1983 draft's statc-to-state
dispute provisions); see also ROBERT R. WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATTES
AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 104, 104-12 (1960) (discussing property protections in pre-
1923 commercial treatics).
49. According to Professors Eric Posner and john Yoo, judges are "independent"
when they are appointed in advance of any particular dispute and serve fixed terms.
Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tibunals, 93 CALiF.
L. REV. 1 (2005).
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sometimes dramatic) events. Suffice it to say that the latter
feature required intense diplomatic efforts or-quite frequently
-what was termed as "gunboat diplomacy," a now prohibited
manifestation of self-help in international affairs.50
Domestic systems also played (and still play) a fundamental
role in disputes over foreign investment, in large part because at
the core of such disputes tends to be the relationship of
property. National authorities have original jurisdiction over this
relationship. They may decide any conflicts originating as a
consequence of the state's involvement in the recognition,
regulation, affectation, extinction, etc. of this relationship,
unless the state consents to an international form of dispute
settlement. Internationalization was-in part-also a response to
demands to complement some of the perceived deficiencies of
domestic courts and in some cases the inexistence of judicial
systems.' Especially in the eyes of capital exporter countries,
national courts-particularly in the recently de-colonialized
world-raised concerns as to capacity for speedy, neutral, and
technical resolution of claims.52
Thus, in theory, prior to the ICSID Convention, the cases
involving property of aliens abroad were initially treated as
domestic conflicts, unless the parties had agreed on compulsory
arbitration. Only after spending economic, diplomatic, or
50. Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theoy oftheAlien Tort Statute. 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 830, 880 (2006) ("[U]nder" traditional state-based principles of international law
-i.e., those from the late eightecnth to the early twentieth centuries-the safe conduct
promise was enforceable through the offended sovereign's right to make war in the
event of a breach."); see also Sir James Cable, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 1919-1979:
POLITICAL APPiICATIONS OF LIMITED NAVAl FORCE 39 (1981).
51. Adjudication was rarely the result of pre-established dispute settlement
arrangements, and very often the result of international agreements or compromises
entered into by states after the alleged illicit conducts. More than once, those
agreements to adjudicate disputes that affecttd the economic interests of nationals
abroad were the product of forcefully negotiated concessions or settlement or peace
agreemeLnts. See Luis M. Drago, State Loans in thei Relation to International Polic, 1 AM.J.
INTL L. 692 (1907) (describing the "steps taken by England, Germany and Italy
in ... 1902, against Venezuela for the settlement of claims of various sorts"). But see
MICHAEL TOMZ. REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT
ACROSS THREE CENTURIES (2007) (arguing that the use of force to collect Venezuelan
debt was exceptional and not motivated solely by default).
52. CRISTOPH H. SCHRLUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 5 (2001)
("Rightly or wrongly, the national courts of one of the disputing parties are not
perceived as sufficiently impartial.").
RECASTING ICSID'S LEGITIMACY DEBATE
military resources could international adjudication follow in a
mercantilist (state-to-state) mode. Only states could bring claims
following the formal rules derived from general international
law, commonly known as exhaustion of local remedies, espousal
of claims, and diplomatic protection.?3 Dr. Aron Broches, often
referred to as the founding father of ICSID, explains the
fundamental change brought by the Convention in the
following way:
From the legal point of view, the most striking feature of the
[ICSID] Convention is that it firmly establishes the capacity
of a private individual or a corporation to proceed directly
against a state in an international forum, thus contributing
to the growing recognition of the individual as a subject of
international law.54
In fact, the private right of action for damages enabled
(and pioneered) by ICSID navigates the contours of private and
public law, contractual and general rights and obligations,
individual and state participation, and national and
international law. It does so by borrowing elements from
different legal structures, 55 including public and private
53. Some argue that the exhaustion of local remedies is also a substantive
obligation. See Andrea K Bjorklund, Waiver and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule in
Nafta furspudence. in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSULS,
CU RRENT PIRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS 253 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004) ("[T]he
proceduralists have won the debate. It is clear that acts outside denials ofjustice can form
the basis for international claims and that state parties can waive the requirement of
exhaustion of local remedies. Moreover, in the investment treaty context that fact is
explicit-most treatics set forth a list of potential violations, such as a failure to provide
national treatment or an expropriation not in accordance with international law. The
'procedure versus substance' distinction nevertheless continues to arise, in N AFTA
cases and elsewhere.").
54. Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, in SELECTED FSSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND
OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 188, 198 (Martinus
Nijhoff ed., 1995) [hereinafter Broches. ESSAYS].
55. The ICSID Convention came into force in October 1966. The rules and
regulations were modeled on differint sources. See Parra, supra note 3, at 57 ("They
also drew inspiration from, among other sources, the Statute and Rules of the World
Court, the International Law Commission's 1958 Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure
and the Permanent Court of Ai bitration's 1962 Rules for Ai bitration and Conciliation
for SCttCnlct of International Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One is a
State.").
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international law, 56 international arbitration and alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR"),57 and international relations and
diplomacy.5 8 These fundamental characteristics were outlined at
the outset of the negotiations of the ICSID Convention as
follows:
a recognition by [s] tates of the possibility of direct access by
private individuals and corporations to an international
tribunal in the field of financial and economic disputes with
Governments:
a recognition by [s] tates that the agreements made by them
with private individuals and corporations to submit such
disputes to arbitration are binding international
undertakings;
the provision of international machinery for the conduct of
arbitration, including the availability of arbitrators, methods
56. The system borrows important legal infrastructure from international law.
Irrespective of whether or not an international investment agreement ("HA"), contract,
or investment law refers to international law as the law applicable to the merits of the
dispute, international law will be the law governing the dispute to the extent that what
is at stake is the international responsibility of a state. The tools available under public
international law for the interpretation and the application of a treaty also determine
formal elements of jurisdiction, competence, attribution, and reparation. See Yas
Banifatcmi, The Law Applicable in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in ARBITRATION UNDLR
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUI)E To THE KEY ISSU4ES (Katia Yannaca-
Small ed., 2010).
57 . Investor-sLtatc arbitration borrows from international arbitration and
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") the idea of technical specialization to deal with
mattCrs wherein the technical complexity surpasses the knowledge of generalist or
parochial judges. It also borrows the idea of procedural fairness and territorial
'neutrality' reflected in institutions such as the party appointed arbitrator/conciliator
and, in the case of the ICSID systen, delocalized arbitration. to ensure the recognition,
enforcement and execution of the arbitration even against the losing party's will.
58. Reputation and the preference for negotiated outcomes are important
elements of international relations practice. Under the eyes of the planner. in an
intLernationally interdependent world, a trustworthy reputation is necessary to attract
FDI. Reputation and cooperation are important for assessing trustworthiness of
international actors and increase the likelihood that they will abide by the terms of
negotiated agreements. These features are evident in dcear mandatCs for registration to
assess formal elements of jurisdiction and ripeness of claims and the collection of data
on states that breach commitment towards investors in a multilateral setting. See Aron
Broches, Theor and Practice of Treaty Registration with Particular Reference to Agreements of
the Interatioal Bank (1957), in Broches, ESSAvs, supra note 54, at 99, 129-58
(examining the attitude of the I(J and its failure to address treaty non-registlration by
reviewing five cases where the issue of registration should have been raised but was
ignored).
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for their selection and rules for the conduct of the arbitral
proceeding;
provision of arbitration as an alternative to conciliation.9
This background, as well as the particular design of the
organization, gives rise to ICSID's three different goal-based
justifications relied on by the organization's leadership to
externally defend its existence. When dissected, the three
sources support different understandings of what the function
of the institution is, sustain different views of the remedy
enabled by the institution, and entail distinct ways to empirically
evaluate the institution.
B. Specialization: International Investment Disputes Settlement
ICSID's first claimed source can be found in its utility as a
specialized facility for international investment dispute
settlement. The particular dynamics found in conflicts over
property relationships involving states and foreign investors have
served as the main justification for the organization.
Both pragmatic and ideological forces animate this source
of legitimacy. Pragmatically, ICSID represents a response to calls
for effective justice in the form of readily available, competent,
neutral, and procedurally informal (compared to the formalities
imposed by public international law) processes for resolving
disputes involving investment abroad. 60 Ideologically, ICSID
reflects the response to a particular way of problematizing types
of economic conflicts and the variability (and specificity) of
factors involved. 6' The response to these demands was a
multilateral governmental organization with authority to enable
specialized forms of international investment disputes
59. Memorandum from A. Broches, Gen. Counsel, to the Executive Directors:
"Settlement of Disputes between Government and Private Parties" (1961), reprinted in 2
HISTORYOF THE CONVENTION, § I (1968) [hereinalter Broches, Note].
60. See EDwIN M. 1ORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTFECTION OF (ITIZENS ABROAD
29 (1915) (" [1] t is cear that by international law there is no legal duty incunbent upon
the state to extend diplomatic protection. Whether such a duty exists towards the
citizen is a mattCr of municipal law of his own countiy, the general rule being that even
under municipal law the state is under no legal duty to extend diplomatic
protection.").
61. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming Claiming . ., L. & SOC'Y RLV. 15. 15-16 (1981) (arguing tLha disputes
in general are social constrIcts).
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settlement, including what is termed arbitration without
privity.62
According to ICSID, proceedings brought to the
organization are treated with neutrality in an institution that
operates under calibrated, truly international rules approved by
a council where all member parties have voting power.63 Under
the specialization claim, the dispute settlement process
administrated by the organization is designed primarily to
respond to concerns over procedural justice and to seek a
settlement or award that confirms that a disrupted investment by
the hands of the state had value.64 The dispute settlement
techniques are consensual and should encourage negotiated
outcomes (i.e., amicable settlement between the parties.) 6
The claim of specialization has a direct conceptual
association with ICSID's Secretariat in Washington, D.C. Its field
is dispute settlement over investments where a state (or
constituent subdivision or agency of the state) is a party. Its
mandate is easily recognizable in Article 25 of the Convention,
which sets the formal elements of the Centre's jurisdiction.66
The broad concept of "investment" adopted in the Convention
places primary control over this delegated authority back in the
hands of the state.67 The flexibility embedded in the term
investment helps states to adapt to changes and to establish the
62. See, e.g., jan Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-FORFIGN
INVESTMENT I.J. 232, 232 (1995) ("This new world of international arbitration is one in
which the claimant need not have a contractual relationship with the defendant").
Arbitration without privity takes place in a setting where the investor (and potential
claimant) need not have a contractual relationship with the state (or potential
defendant). Id.
63. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(2) (outlining voting proc edure).
64. See generally E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution:
UsingProceduralFairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCL Q 224, 225 (1993).
65. ICSID, Rules oj Procedure fir Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) Rule 21,
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/I(SID/I(SID/RulesMainjsp [hereinafter
ICSID Arbitration Rules].
66. ICSI) Convention, supra note 1, art. 25.
67. Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of Investment": ICS1D's Travaux and the
Domain ofInternational Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257, 260 (2010) (suggesting
reasons of why tribunals should defer to state commitments to investors).
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limits of their own consensual delegation to the Centre's
jurisdiction.68
The contours of ICSID's claim of expertise are also evident
in the provisions of the Convention concerning the qualities of
neutral decision-makers. Not only do these provisions demand
that arbitrators be independent from the parties in the dispute,
but they also emphasize competence in the fields of law,
commerce, industry, and finance. 69 Moreover, formal rules
establish a methodology that ensures that a party cannot block
the proceedings by refusing to cooperate in the tribunal or
commission's constitution, M or by not paying the required
administrative fees of the proceedings. 1 The Secretary-General
is vested with powers akin to a Registrar's to refuse registration
of cases manifestly outside of the formal limits of the
Convention, discontinue proceedings for lack of payment (by
the moving party), or appoint arbitrators when necessary.72
Under this first claim, ICSID is an agreed forum to enable
and administer dispute settlement in a neutral way. With ICSID
and the threat of neutrally-administrated international dispute
settlement technique-the argument follows-even the most
sturdy state can become attractive for investors, including states
who had not originally stipulated international forms of dispute
settlement in individual contracts. This feature, also known as
open-ended consent, obviates the need for investors to negotiate
the internationalization of a regime consisting of arbitration and
an international law clause into individual contracts with the
host state.
Professor Michael Reisman presents ICSID as a forum for
enabling compulsory forms of dispute settlement to facilitate
negotiated outcomes and guarantee bargaining power via a
68. See ICSID 1984 REPORT, supra note 17 (characterizing the absence of a clear
definition of the notion of investncnt in the ICSID Convention as "a wise
precaution").
69. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 14.
70. See id. art. 38 (allowing Chairman to appoint an arbitrator ninety days after
notice at the request of one party, and after "consulting both parties as far as
possible"); ICSIDArbitration Rules, supra note 65. at 105-06.
71. The financial provisions of the ICSID re ginmc are cnuincrated under Chapter
III of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. ICSID A'btration Rules, supra note 65, at 1 11.
72. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, ats. 36(3). 38; ICSID, Administrative and
Financial Regulations, Regulation 14(3), available at ILp://icsid.worldbank.org/I(SID/
ICSID/RulesMain.jsp.
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private right of action, independent of the ad hoc, individual
negotiation, licensing, or other parts of the investment process,
in a fundamentally asymmetrical context as follows:
A common feature of foreign direct investment is that the
investor has sunk substantial capital in the host [s] tate, and
cannot withdraw it or simply suspend delivery and write off a
small loss as might a trader in a long-term trading
relationship. The Romans said "potior est conditio defendentis,"
and this is likely to be the situation in foreign direct
investment. So rather than having an equality of bargaining
power in an exclusively negotiation-based regime, parity will
cease and things will tilt heavily in favor of the respondent
[s] tate. Unless, that is, both sides appreciate that if
negotiations fail, compulsory arbitration will follow.
C. De-Politicization: International Economic Legalization
The second source adopts the stereotype followed by some
international law experts that power is a force that works in
opposition to law. Prior to ICSID's system, international conflicts
over the treatment of foreign property experienced the direct
involvement of the states of nationality of the investor and the
investment's host. In such context-according to the
foundational assumptions underpinning ICSID-the
involvement would inescapably favor powerful states over weaker
ones. With the increasing complexity of international relations
this could give rise to paralyzing diplomatic confrontations and
destructive zero-sum games between states affected by the
conflict.74
ICSID, however, attempts to create a mutually beneficial
setting for all the parties involved. It does so by
compartmentalizing potentially daunting conflicts between
states into individual disputes between investors and states.
This-some argue-helps to "de-politicize" internationally
distressing conflicts, liberating a tense space between states to be
73. W. Michael Reisman, international Investment Arbitration and ADR: Warried but
Best Living Apart. 24 ICSID RLV.-FORLIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 185, 190-91 (2009)
(emphasis in original).
74. Richard H. Steinberg & jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and, ternatonalLaw, 100
AM. J. INTL L. 64 65 (2006) (" [L]egal rules and institutions did not arise out of the
power of the coercive state but, rather. out of custom, consensus, and private
ordering.").
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employed for building constructive relationships. This
approach tames the role of power in world politics, favoring
long-term cooperation and diplomatic solidarity.
As the goal-based argument goes, to compartmentalize
conflicts and relax state-to-state relations, a less formal order (as
compared to the system of adjudication of public international
law) and more transparent process (as compared to the
informal efforts that the WB would provide at request of
member states) was "institutionalized." 76 Thus, by allowing an
individual or a corporation to proceed directly against a state in
an international forum, ICSID arguably helps to reduce the
interference of the state of nationality of the investor in the
domestic affairs of the host state. This should also be reassuring
for the host state because it allows it to avoid the acceptance of
the jurisdiction of the courts of another state. Moreover, the WB
was relieved of and added transparency to some of "the extra-
curricular burdens" assumed from time to time at request of the
state members.
By relying on the legal order enabled by ICSID, the foreign
investor improves her position by having a better ability to assess
the risks in investing abroad, and if the reasonable operating
assumptions are affected by illicit government intervention the
foreign investor may be able to succeed in an independent legal
process.78 By obviating the need for diplomatic protection, the
investor has much more control, including the ability to
influence the outcome by bringing arguments that better fit her
reality and appointing a neutral, yet suitable decision-maker
75. Martins Paparinskis argues that the concept of de-politicization may be used in
four different fashions but "has no self-evident use for conceptualising and resolving
modern challenges." See Martins Paparinskis, The Limits of Depoliticisation in
Contemporary Investor-St ate Arbitratio, in 3 SEILFCT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN
SOCIETYOF INTERNATIONAL lAW 271 (James Craw-ford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2010). In
this Article I take the meaning officially advanced by the institution's leadership and
not other possible uses of the same concept.
76. Memorandum from the General Counsel to the Executive Directors (Jan. 19,
1962), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION 6 (1968).
77. Id.
78. Philip C. Jessup, Responsibility of States for Injuries to Individuals, 46 COLLM. L.
REV. 903, 908 (1946) (describing the pre-ICSID limitations on foreign investor's
power); seeJ.IL. BRIERIY, THE IAW OF NATIONS 277-78 (6th ed., 1963) (arguing that
state-to-state procedure "is far from satisfactory from the individual's point of view. He
has no remedy of his own. and the state to which hie belongs may be unwilling to take
up his case for reasons which have nothing to do with its merits").
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(conciliator or arbitrator). In this sense, this second
foundational source follows a corrective justice rationale because it
is more interested in the "victim's" perspective, i.e. the entity
that allegedly suffered injustice at the hands of the infracting
state.7 9
For the host state and the state of nationality of the investor
the benefits are also clear: not only under Article 27 would the
respondent avoid facing the state of nationality of the investor
(often more powerful given investment trends) in the dispute,
but both could focus on building constructive relationships and
avoiding foul claims over money.8"1 This individual-state mode of
dispute settlement will reduce the possibility of abuse by
powerful states by prohibiting the espousal of the claim, unless
the respondent state fails to abide by and comply with the
pecuniary obligations of the awards.8'
The goal of a de-politicized system is to resolve disputes
required by building a specific legal and institutional
infrastructure into the ICSID Convention. This infrastructure
represented a historical quid pro quo: the private right of action
and the commitment of states to recognize and enforce
pecuniary obligations as if they were the final judgment of a
national court were paralleled by the obligation on the part of
the state of nationality of the investor not to intervene in the
dispute. 82 In addition, the ICSID Convention changed the
79. For a discussion of the history of modern corrective justice theory, see George
P. Fletcher, Remembering Gar-And Tort Themy, 50 UCLA L. REv. 279, 287 (2002)
(arguing that "strict liability-liability for harned caused by risk-taking without
wrongdoing-is a fact of modern tort law").
80. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q RV. 438, 454
(1947), reprinted in 2 INTLRNATIONAL LAw, BEING THL COLLECTED PAPLRS OF HLRSCH
LAUTERPACHT 487, 504 (1975) (arguing that the espousal of a claim by the state tends
to impart the complexion of political controversy and of unfriendly action); ICSID
Convention, supra note 1. art. 27.
81. See SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 416. Professor Schreuer explains: ]he
arbitration procedure provided by ICSID offers considerable advantages to both sides.
The foreign investor no longer depends on the uncertainties of diplomatic protection
but obtains direct access to an international remedy. The dispute settlement process is
depoliticized and subjected to objective lkgal criteria . . . . In turn, the host State by
consenting to ICSID arbitration obtains the assurance that it will not be exposed to an
international claim by the investor's home." Id.
82. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 54. ICSID has a particular advantage
since its le tLhodology also allows for what is called a dclocalized system of enforcement
preventing the intervention of domestic courts in reviewing ICSID decisions. Art. 54 of
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presumption of operation of the local remedies rule for the
signing states. Under Aiticle 26 of the Convention, ICSID
signatories maintain the right to require the prior exhaustion of
local remedies, however, in the absence of an express
requirement the state is deemed to have consented to such
forum to the exclusion of any other remedy, including domestic
courts.8
In short, this second source of legitimacy originates from
the attempts to compartmentalize international economic
conflicts and the consequent insulation of inter-state politics
through a formal legal process84 Under this view, ICSID is a
system of protection of foreign investors and de-politicization of
investment disputes. This view of ICSID and investor-state
arbitration is adopted by many scholars, including one of the
main drafters of the Convention, Professor Andreas F.
Lowenfeld. In his view:
[T]he essential feature of investor-[s]tate arbitration, as it
has developed since the ICSID Convention of 1965 . . . is
that controversies between foreign investors and host
[s] tates are insulated from political and diplomatic relations
between states. In return for agreeing to independent
international arbitration, the host state is assured that the
state of the investor's nationality (as defined) will not
espouse the investor's claim or otherwise intervene in the
controversy between an investor and a host [S] tate, for
instance by denying foreign assistance or attempting to
pressure the host State into some kind of settlement.
Correspondingly, the state of the investor's nationality is
the ICSID Convention "excludes any attack on the award in the national courts."
Edward Baldwin, Mark Kantor & Michael Nolan, Liits to Enfor cement ofICSIDAwards,
23 J. INT'L ARB. 1, 1 (2006) (quoting MINE v.Republic GuinCa, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/4 (1985)).
83. ICSID Convention, supra note 1. arts. 26, 42. As argued by 1. Shihata, the
Convention was superior to the Calvo Doctrine because: (1) prohibited a contracting
party giving diplomatic protection to nationals (Article 26); (2) allowed States to
require exhaustion of local remedics (Article 27); and, (3) perminted countries to
stipulate that their relationship with foreign investors was governed by domestic law
(Article 42) seeI. Shihata, ICSID and Latin America, NEWSFROM ICSID 2 (1984).
84. See Ibrahim Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Iwestment Disputes: The
Role ofJICSID and MIGA, ICSI) REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMFNT L.J. I (198); see also Robert
B. Shanks, Lessons in the Management of Political Risk: Infrastructure Projects (A Legal
Perspective), in MANAGING INTLRNATIO.NAL POLITICAL RISK 83, 93 (Theodore Moran ed.,
1998).
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relieved of the pressure of having its relations with the host
State disturbed or distorted by a controversy between its
national and the host [s] tate.8 5
D. Stabilization: International Public Policy Institution
The post-war stabilization efforts resulted in the continued
desire on the part of western policy-makers to involve private
enterprise in economic activity and to encourage private
investment to eventually replace aid programs and state
subsidization. At the same time, these efforts contributed to
understanding risk management and the creation of agencies to
address non-commercial risks like inconvertibility,
expropriation, civil war, revolution, or insurrection.?
These ideas of risk reduction and economic efficiency
underscore the third goal claimed by ICSID: stabilization of
economic policy. Informed by neoclassical economic theory,
some economists and development specialists advocated-
successfully-for the extension of a private right of action for
damages as a risk reducing commitment. Under this theory,
private FDI leads to economic growth and economic
development. In order to encourage FDI, well-defined property
rights adopted in different instruments of protection (i.e.,
relationship-specific contracts, foreign investment laws or
investment treaties) shall be complemented by access to a
functional dispute-settlement forum. The third goal-based
argument continues as follows: without a proper forum,
property rights' enforcement would be unreliable, unreliability
creates higher risks, and therefore lower incentives to invest.
85. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Separate Opinion, in Corn Products Int'l, Inc. v. United
Mexican States, ICSID CASE No. ARB(AF)/04/01 (NAFTA) (2008).
86. See SHAYERAH I11AS, CONG. RESEARCH SFRV., 98-567, THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE
INVESTMENT CORPORATION: BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVT ISSUFs 2-3 (uly 5, 2011),
available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-567.pdf (stating that the creation in 1969 of
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), as an agency of the United States
under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State, took investment guaranty
operatLions of AID).
87. Broches, Note, supra note 59, at 2. In the words of one of the delegates
participating in the ICSID Convention negotiation: "cconomric developnent could not
be achieved without capital and . . . developing countries would not obtain capital
unless they provided adequate [legal] guarantees." Id.
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Under this third justificatory source, ICSID is identified as a
multilateral governmental organization within the domain of
international economic policy stabilization and cooperation.
ICSID is one of five organizations of the WB, all of them working
individually within their mandate but in coordination under the
same mission. ICSID is designed to allow for maximum
flexibility in implementing economic policy strategies to involve
the private sector, formalize FDI protection, and establish a
mechanism for enforcement of such commitments that would
deter opportunistic and rapacious behavior on the part of
governments against foreigner investors.
It is important to clarify that ICSID and the Convention
create no obligation to submit any particular dispute to
conciliation or arbitration. However, ICSID membership,
combined with an instrument of protection consenting to
ICSID's jurisdiction may be a sufficient combination of
substantive and procedural commitments to create a reliable
system. ICSID is therefore, considered to be the enforcement
side that minimizes some risks for long-term commitment of
resources. The quid pro quo in this strategy requires states to
surrender original jurisdiction for potential claims to
international investment dispute settlement in the hope of
attracting sustained fluxes of foreign investment that will
increase the possibilities for economic development. For that,
the focus of the dispute settlement process under this claim is
deterrence; the process of economic compensation to affected
investors serves mainly as an ex post remedy in order to assure
that ex ante potential wrongdoers will weigh the costs of injury
against the benefits of productive activity.
This justification finds background in the very first sentence
of the Convention's Preamble, which refers to "the need for
international cooperation for economic development and the
role of private international investment therein."" Moreover,
the WB's role in coordinating this larger economic policy
objective is reflected in the management of ICSID (the
President of the VB as ex officio Chairman of the
Administrative Council), the seat of the Centre (the principal
88. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, at Preamble (Apr. 2006), available
athttps://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSI)/StaticFiles/basicdoc/main-eng.htm.
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office of the WB), the Memorandum of Administrative
Arrangement dealing with the financing of the Centre (the WB
covers the overhead of expenditures of the Centre)," and the
different operational policies that coordinate ICSID and the
WB.90 In addition, the WB often promotes a strategy built
around protection of property rights and arbitration as an
effective mechanism for dispute resolution that incentivizes
long-term commitment of resources? 11
Under this third source, ICSID is part of a multilateral
economic organization that enables cooperation to facilitate the
use of private rights of action for damages as a risk-reducing
commitment. This, the argument follows, deters the
opportunistic, rapacious, and nationalistic behavior of states,
having in mind-in the long run-incentivizing foreign
investment. This theory is expressed in the analysis of law and
economic scholars like Professor Alan 0. Sykes:
The utility of a private right of action for money damages is
obvious. To see why, consider a world of [bilateral
investment treaties] without the private action. In the event
of an uncompensated expropriation or similar action, an
89. See Memorandum of Administrative Arrangements Agreed between the
International Banks for Reconstruction and Development and the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (Feb. 13. 1967), reprinted in ICSID. ANNUAL
REPORT 15 (1967). The Memorandum was signed on February 13, 1967, and entered
into force retroactively as of October 14. 1966. By this arrangement, renewed
automatically from year to year uness denounced by cither party, the Executive
Directors formalized the commitment (stated in paragraph 17 of their Report
accompanying the Convention) to provide the Centre with free office accommodations
and to underwrite, within reasonable limits, the basic overhead expenditures of the
Centre for some years after its establishment. The Centre is obliged to reimburse the
Bank for this assistance only to the extent that any expenditures are attributable to
proceedings. Id.; see Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 17
(Mar. 18, 1965). 4 I.L.M. 524. 525 [hereinafter Executive Directors' Report]. available
at https://icsid.worldbank.org/IC SID/ StaticFiles/ basiedoc/partB.htin ("The Bank
should be prepared to provide the Centre with office accommodation free of charge as
long as the Centre has its sCat at the Bank's headquarters and to underwrite, within
reasonable limits, the basic overhead.").
90. See WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL POLICY STATEMENT, 7.40: DISPUTES OVER
DEFAULTS ON EXTERNAL DEBT, EXPROPRIATION, AND BREACH OF CONTRACT 1 (2001),
available at http://go.worldbank.org/W'BOMT5JITUO (dcaling with suspension of
lending operations to recalcitrant parties).
91. See Investment Across Borders and Indicators, WORLD BANK.
hLLp://iab.worldbank.org/Data/Explorc%( 20Topics/Arbitrating-disputes (last visited
Oct. 24, 2012).
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investor would have to lobby her own government to take
some sort of action against the violator state. The investor
might be politically inefficacious in this process for any
number of reasons. She might be unable to offer enough
political benefits in return for the governments' assistance.
Her government might have diplomatic reasons for
declining to take any action or for declining to retaliate
against the violator in any effective way. And even if some
retaliation were forthcoming, the retaliation might do
nothing to compensate the investor for her losses.
Considerable risk for investors would remain, and the risk
premium on new investments would reflect it. A credible
promise of monetary compensation to investors, by contrast,
in an amount set by neutral arbitrators, goes much further
to reduce investment risk and to achieve the developing
countries' goal of lowering the cost of foreign capital.92
In summary, ICSID has defended its existence by relying on
three goal-based claims, all of which find background in the
organization's mandate and constitutive instrument: first, as an
institution specialized in international methods for investment
dispute settlement; second, as a system to achieve legalization
towards an increased "de-politicization" of investment disputes;
and, third as a multilateral organization that facilitates economic
policy stabilization and the removal of impediments to the free
international flow of private investment that are posed by non-
commercial risks. This distinction also helps understand how the
three dimensions of investor-state arbitration under ICSID stress
particular theories of compensation: first, as the preferred
specialized international method for investment dispute
settlement concerned with procedural justice; second, as a self-
contained and delocalized process to deciding legal disputes
between states and investors allowing for direct corrective justice,
and third, as a multilateral enforcement mechanism concerned
with deterrence of conducts affecting investment abroad. The
following section discusses how these different conceptions
render different analytical assessments.
92. Alan 0. Sykes. Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law:
Standing and Remed, 34J. LEGAL. STUD. 631, 643 (2005).
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111. ASSESSMENT: EVALUATION, EWDENCE, AND CRITIQUE
Using Shihata's insights in official documents of the
organization, this final section proposes a research agenda for
empirical investigations on ICSID. I argue that the three sources
identified above are concerned with specific outcomes, are
susceptible to critiques posed by diverse theoretical approaches
to international law and therefore compel scholars to perform
detailed empirical assessments to evaluate ICSID's effectiveness
in response to the Centre's critics."
A. Facilitating Conflict Avoidance, Access tojustice, and Dispute
Settlement
ICSID's emphasis on its expertise in international
investment dispute settlement implies a particular identification
of success. As presented under the specialization approach, its
effectiveness relates to preventing the escalation of conflicts by
empowering individuals and corporations to directly participate
in a fair and functional justice system and dispute settlement
process.> Shihata cleverly recognized this as the primary role of
ICSID, linking the institution's success to the dispute settlement
process as follows:
[ICSID should not] be assessed only on the basis of the
number of disputes that have been submitted to or settled
by ICSID. When an ICSID clause provides for compulsory
arbitration [it] contributes to conflict avoidance as well as to
settlement of conflicts if they arise.95 [Hence, the] high
proportion of settlements . . . shows the real contribution
that ICSID can make in restoring the climate of mutual
93. See, e.g, (us Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the International
Investment Regime, 1 15, (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/
public-statement (recommending that international organizations "refrain from
priomoting investment treatics and should conduct, research and make
recomflmefndations on the serious risks posed to governments by investment treaty
arbitration; on preferred alternatives to investment treaty arbitration including private
risk insurance and contract-based arbitration; and on strategies for states to pursue
withdrawal fron or renegotiation of their investment treaties.").
94. Reisman, supra note 73, at 186 (assessing "very little, [third-party] dispute
resolution [under ICSID] and much of is alircady being disposed of through informal
setLLlCn").
95. ICSID, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 4 [hereinafter ICSID 1986 REPORT].
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confidence between States and investors, which is the
paramount objective of ICSID.9
In spite of the ICSID founders' good intentions,
international policy scholars have voiced important criticism
against it. In their eyes, the problem is that the techniques
promoted, especially ad hoc investor-state arbitration, are not
fair because decision-makers are not truly independent. 9
Moreover, according to some of them, "the decision-making has
been placed primarily in the hands of an exceedingly small pool
of super-elite, like-minded international lawyers who operate
largely divorced from any local political process." "
Furthermore, in part because of design elements, ICSID is not
truly accessible to the majority of the business community."
Therefore, the interests of large transnational corporations are
served particularly well by the establishment of legal
empowerment rules that in actuality are accessible to very few
actors and in effect support the power positions of already
empowered economic participants.
There are a number of empirical questions to evaluate the
goals of ICSID in this realm that could be posed against this line
of critique. These questions may be aggregated into two broad
policy inquiries: (1) what precise role does expertise and
specialization play in international dispute settlement?; (2) is
ICSID an adequate venue for the resolution of international
investment disputes?
96. Id.
97. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Political Science Research on International
Law: The State of the Field, 106 AM._J. INT'L L. 47, 85 (2012) (" [P]olitical scientists have
recently analyzed several ways in which delegation of problems and conflicts to
international courts shapes legal evolution. One important finding is that the extent of
such delegation increases with two variables relating to the design of courts: judicial
independence (which depends on the selection method and tenure of judges) and
access. Another important linding-which resonates with wvork done by lawyers on the
impact of independent tribunals-is that access for private, non-state litigants and
conpulsory jurisdiction both contribute to judicial independence.").
98. Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sant Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors
Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Realit,, 32 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1550, 1610-
11 (2008).
99. See Karen j. Alter, Prvate Litigants and the Ne Inteirnational Courts, 39 COMP.
POL. STUD. 22, 46 (2006) (noting that notwiithstanding the increase of compulsory
jurisdiction, international adjudicaive bodies still have linited resources for the
majority of the business community).
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Any assessment of the effects of ICSID as an institution
specialized in international methods for investment dispute
settlement must compare what happens to cases brought to
ICSID with what would have happened to like cases in the
absence of ICSID. 00 This analysis raises complex methodological
challenges, including inexistent or, at best, anecdotal evidence.
Another particular difficulty in this assessment relates to the
effects on what Shihata termed "conflict avoidance." 101 At
minimum, this raises a complex question: can a connection
between an ICSID clause and a negotiated outcome be
established? Similarly complex is the effect of ICSID on access to
a dispute settlement process. ICSID's design is premised on the
hypothesis that it provides a forum for litigants who otherwise
would not have any real venue or would settle early in effort to
avoid unwanted costs or delays involved in the more formal
system of public international law: the unpredictability of
diplomatic negotiations, or the unreliability of domestic courts.
Assessing the role of ICSID in this realm implies ascertaining
whether the establishment of ICSID changed the rate at which
cases otherwise covered by ICSID's jurisdictional domain in
other venues are filed as well as the rate at which they are
decided. It also involves understanding whether ICSID increased
access to adjudicative processes and, if so, which and how
corporations or individuals are using this private, non-state
litigation forum.
Since, as explained, the specialization claim is primarily
concerned with procedural justice, some goal-based elements of
procedural justice could serve to assess the effectiveness of
ICSID. Among these elements are the cost of litigation (as
compared to other settings) or the extent to which ICSID's
expertise affects the cost of litigating a case, the case delay or
whether ICSID caused cases to be resolved more or less rapidly,
100. See generally Yackee, supra note 9 (analyzing bilateral investment treaties in
this comparative matter). Susan Franck tackles one aspect of this question, concluding
about ICSID arbitration process that "it was not possible to ascertain evidence of bias at
ICSID in the pre-2007 population of investment treaty awards. Certain results suggested
that allegations of bias related to amounts claimed may create a basis for concern, but
would be improperly attributed to ICSID in the pre-2007 population." Franck, ICSID
EJfect, supra note 8, at 831.
101. See ICSI) 1986 REPORT, supra note 95, at 4.
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and whether ICSID led to more favorable reactions than other
litigation experiences in comparable and alternative venues.
Addressing these questions would help assess the value of
adversarial arbitration in settings where resolving conflicts in
modalities other than transparent third party decisions can
undermine the credibility of governments.
These are just a few examples of specific empirical inquiries
connected with ICSID's goal as a forum for enabling compulsory
forms of specialized dispute settlement. Answering these
questions may promote confidence among key stakeholders of
the system and ensure that when conciliation or arbitration is
used to finally resolve investment disputes, it is resolved
properly, addressing the needs of disputants. It would also invite
the Centre to respond to more objective questions-even
perhaps-compelling the institution to move away from
defending its success simply by using the number of cases
registered each year as a standard baseline. 0o
B. Limiting Abuses of Diplomatic Protection
The specialization and the de-politicization claims are both
concerned with the effects of legal proceedings on conflict.
However, de-politicization is specifically concerned with the
effect on the diplomatic relationship between the state of
nationality of the investor and the host state of the investor.
Under this claim, international legalization results in justice and
equality among states and without de-politicization, global
power-relegated to the sphere of power politics-would
reign. 03 Promoters would argue that with ICSID as a formal
dispute settlement mechanism between investors and states,
102. ICSID, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 5 [hereinafter ICSI) 2009 REPORT] (noting
the growing nunber of cases registered by the Centre); ICSID, 1999 ANNUAL RLPORT 4
(describing the elfect of various investment treaty arrangements on the ICSID's
increasing caseload).
103. This dichotomy finds a classical expression in the context of ICSID and IIA
since it relates to the relationship between strong, capital-exporter states that may use
power diplomacy to force weaker, capital-imiporter states to Settle in unequal terms.
Professor Sornarajah states that one feature of the IIAs "is that they are treatics
between unequal partners." M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVLSTMENT 207 (1994). For lists of bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") by country
see ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, ICSID, hLpS://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet (follow "Bilateral Investment Treaties" hyperlink).
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politics can be framed in stable ways to facilitate the pursuit of
other instrumental goals.104
In relying on this goal-based justification, Shihata
considered that the assessment of ICSID should also be
connected to its ability to provide political stability and to act as
a tool for balancing power between asymmetrical states. For
Shihata "[ICSID] provide [s] developing countries with a
response which, compared to the Calvo Doctrine, is both more
adequate in the depoliticization of disputes and more effective
in the encouragement of foreign investment, without inviting
the abuses of diplomatic protection."11 Accordingly:
[A] nother encouraging factor [of the ICSID] is the fact that
. . . the history of ICSID shows a high degree of State
participation in the proceedings [allowing] the States
against which proceedings have been instituted [to present]
their own grievances in the form of counterclaims that
insured them a full day in court. This consideration is of
direct interest to the effectiveness of ICSID awards.106
Critics would argue that this picture of ICSID is idealized.
International realists as well as critical legal scholars have long
pointed to the ways in which international law itself is
instrumental to and shaped by power.' 1 Moreover, the idea of
international legalization, with judges and adjudication as a
centerpiece, is often a form of denying that the work of these
elite players is also ideologically based, and reinforced by the
stereotype that power is a force that works in opposition to
104. See Christian Reus-Srnit, The Politics of International Law, in THE POLITICS OF
INTLRNATIONAL LAw 1, 36 (Christian Reus-Sinit cd., 2004) (concluding that institutions
are "created by political actors as structuring or ordering devices, as rnechanisms for
framing politics in ways that enshrine predominant notions of kgitimate agency,
stabilize individual and collective purposes, and facilitate the pursuit of instrumental
goals").
105. See Shihata, supra note 84, at 24-25.
106. See ICSID 1986 RLPORT, supra note 95, at 4.
107. For a classic discussion on the role of power see KENNETH NX. WALTZ, THFORY
OF 1INTLRNATIONAL POLITICS (1979) (arguing that international rules are the
pronouncements of powerful states and are subject to change along with fluctuations in
state power). See alsojohn J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise ojnternational Institutions,
19 INT'L SLC. 5, 7 (1995) (arguing that international institutions cannot have
independent effects on sta[e behavior); supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text
(discussing the role of power in international law).
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law. 108 At the same time, international adjudicatory bodies may
serve as substitutes that allow domestic power brokers to exit
local jurisdictions with poor institutions or to affect judicial
politics around specific normative issues by extending corrective
options to foreign investors. *
Several questions touch upon the debate as framed by the
second goal-based source and critique. These questions can also
be aggregated into larger policy inquiries such as the following:
(1) what precise role does ICSID's investor-state form of
legalization play in the stabilization of diplomatic relations?;
and, (2) how does power interact with other forces to shape
outcomes under this system?
Of course, research would not adopt a simple view of power
since isolating the effect of international law from other
influences on behavior is complex and would involve
prohibitively laborious analysis. However, to assess the effects of
ICSID as a de-politicized system, scholars can compare what
happens in cases brought to ICSID against similar cases in which
there was an espousal of a claim by a state, cases involving
diplomatic negotiations (assuming it is possible to know), or
cases that were brought by private parties in other forums.o
Promising empirical research already involves sorting out the
effect of power in the distribution of ICSID outcomes.
Other questions of effectiveness that relate to power and
politics are more easily addressed by empirical evidence.
Subjective (disputant oriented) effects of ICSID could give some
hints of the value of the Centre. This would involve assessing
how parties value ICSID as a corrective mechanism, as well as
108. Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!. XV LEG. STUDIES
FORUM 327, 328 (1991) (arguing in part that early conservative economic rhetoric
justified the existing capitalist system as being based on freedom). For a discussion on
the stereotype see Steinberg & Zasloff. supra note 74, at 74 ("[S]tate behavior and
associated international outcomes may appear to be shaped by international law, but
because international law mirrors the interests of powerful states, international law is
merely an epiphenomenon of underlying power.").
109. See Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions, 25 INT'L
RLV. L. & ECON. 107. 108 (2005): see also Sergio Puig, Investor-State Tribunals and
Constitutional Courts: The MexicanS s , Saga, 5 MEX. L. RLV. 199, 238 (2013)
([upranational adjudicatory bodies may affect domestic politics by empowering and
expanding corrective options to foreign investo rs.").
110. For an empirical analysis comparing ICSID proceedings with other investor-
state arbitration decisions see Franck, ICSID Effet, supra note 8, at 850-61.
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assessing whether, and to what extent, the Centre promotes a
sense of participation (voice), trust and satisfaction with the
process on the part of foreign investors and respondent states.
That being said, such an endeavor is made difficult by the fact
that the main users of the system mediate the preferences of a
number of constituencies.
The empirical evidence for understanding this set of
questions would consist of extensive surveys within signatory
states and claimants and counterfactual scenario analyses. It
would also involve case studies to compare the experiences of
countries that rely on private rights of action in IIAs or
investment laws, with those that have followed different
strategies. However, improving our understanding of the
political dimension of ICSID, albeit in minor ways-at the very
least-may encourage ICSID to assess its success in more
concrete ways than simply by referring to its growing caseload,
membership, or the participation of respondent states in
arbitration proceedings. 111
C. Securing Stable and Increasing Flow of Resources
ICSID's ultimate goal is to add certainty and incentivize
flows of FDI, thereby promoting economic growth and national
economic development.112 This is anchored in the third goal-
based source of legitimacy. This source, in turn exposes the
institution to another type assessment, which implied that "the
prospect of involvement in [ICSID] proceedings will work as a
deterrent to the actions which give rise to the institution of
proceedings."113 Therefore, ICSID:
should be regarded as an effective instrument of
international public policy which is meant in the final
analysis to secure a stable and increasing flow of resources
to developing countries under reasonable
conditions. ... ICSID is not merely a dispute settlement
mechanism, [it] aims at improving the international
111. ICSID 2011 RLPORT, supra note 15, at 6 (noting the growing meinbership
and caseload of the Centre as marker of success).
112. Executive Directors' Report, supra note 89, [ 10; see Kenneth j. Vandevelde,
The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States. 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 258
(1988) (describing "te absolute right to binding third-party investment disputes").
113. ICSID 1986 REPORT, supra note 95, at 4.
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investment climate .... ICSID should renew its efforts to
secure a stable and increasing flow of resources to
developing countries under reasonable conditions."'
The embedded idea in this source-investors as rational
decision makers-has been most recently challenged by the
findings of behavioral economists and social psychologists, who
showed that human decisions are not purely rationa.115 Instead,
they are susceptible to systematic biases and errors, and they are
greatly affected by internal processes that do not correspond to
cost-benefit analysis.) 1 Similarly, law and society scholars have
long argued that law-related considerations often play a
surprisingly minor role in the organization and implementation
of business affairs and decisions to invest.117 Moreover, since the
underlying assumption of the system is that flows of foreign
investment lead to economic development, law-and-
development scholars contest that the ideas promoted by ICSID
limit, rather than incentivize, the inclusion of meaningful
provisions for the promotion of economic development in
ILAs.1 18 Finally, there is a concern by such strand of international
law scholarship that in the attempt to deter actions that may give
rise to ICSID proceedings, actual democratic choices are
overlooked and the regulatory space of states is diminished."9
This, at the same time, affects the capacity of governments to act
114. ICSID 1984 REPORT, supra note 17, at 4-5.
115. See generally Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes & David. G. Victor,
The Behavioral Psychology ofElite Decision Making: Implicationsfir Political Science (Univ. of
Cal., San Diego, Sch. of Int'l Relations & Pac. Studs., 2011), available at
http: /polisci2.ucsd.cdu/dhugh es/research /Elites.pdf.
116. Id.
117. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliinnary Study,
28 AM. Soc. RLV. 1, 12 (1963) ("while detailed planning and legal sanctions play a
signifcant role in some exchanges between businesses, in main business exchanges
their role is small."); see also Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS.
L. RLV. 465, 467 (1985) ("Contract planning and contract law. at best. stand at the
margin of important long-term continuing business relations. Business people often do
not plan, exhibit great care in drafting contracts, pay much attention to those that
lawyers carefully draft, or honor a legal approach to business relationships.").
118. See generilly THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATILS. DOUBLE TA)ATION TREATIES & INVESTMENT FLOWS
(Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) [hereinafter EFFECTS OF TREATILS ON FDI].
119 .ee gen erall M. SORNARAfAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT (2004); Letter from Kate Horner t al., Friends of the Earth, to Wesley
Scholz, U.S. Deparinent of State 2 (Jul. 31 2009), available at hItp://www.citl.org/
Publicatiois/BITCommentsAug09.pdf.
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in the public interest by way of innovative policy-making in
response to changing social, economic, and environmental
conditions.120
The third set of researchable policy questions may address
the assessment of this goal: (1) what do ICSID clauses add to
what was already available to protect investments from problems
of credible commitment?; (2) what are the trade-offs created by
instruments containing ICSID clauses?
Within the empirical agenda, these types of questions have
attracted the attention of interdisciplinary researchers, who have
valiantly attempted to explain the IIAs' causes and consequences
and the impact of instruments (especially bilateral investment
agreements) containing ICSID clauses. 121 However, researchers
in the field have faced multiple conceptual difficulties and
problems with data quality.'2 At a minimum, two important
challenges remain: first, not all IIAs are created equal and not
all ICSID clauses and models of accession to international
dispute settlement are the same, obfuscating the inferences that
can be drawn from large samples; second, why the IIA-ICSID
system is any better suited to performing the task at hand
(increase in FDI fluxes) than its primary competitors requires
more theorizing.'
120. For a recent book trying to identih and address some of the system concerns,
such as limitations on domestic policy space, a lack of democratic accountability, a
systemic pro-investor bias, and the inability of treaties to respond to changes in
econoic circumstances see THE BACKI1ASH AGAINST INVTSTMENT ARBITRATION
(Michael Waibel ct al., eds., 2010).
121. See Mary Hallward-I)rierneier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI Only
a Bit ... And Ther Could Bite, in EFFECTS oF TREATIES ON Em), supra note 118, at 349,
368 (concluding that "littlc evidence that a BIT can act as a substitute for weak
domestic institutions"); see generally Eric Neurnayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral
Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WVORIL)
DELLOPMLNT 1567 (2005); Andrew T. Guzinan, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt
Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral ITnestment Treaties. 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639
(1998); (. Todd Allec & Clint Pcinhardt, Contingent Credibility: The Impact ofInvestinent
Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment, 65 INT'L ORG. 401 (2011) (concluding that
BITs do increase FDI into countries that sign them, but only if those countries are not
subsequently challenged before ICSID. On the other hand, governments suffer notable
losses of FDI when they are taken before ICSID and sutffer even grater losses when
they lose an ICSID dispute).
122. See generali Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 33 BROOKLYN.J. INT1 L. 405 (2008).
123. Id.
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Moreover, understanding this relationship, at least in the
context of ICSID, assumes that influxes of FDI act as proxy for a
positive effect in national economic development. Despite the
strong conceptual case for a positive relationship between
economic growth, national development, and FDI-the
empirical evidence has been mixed at best, thus adding further
conceptual difficulties. First, like in the case of IIAs, not all FDI
is equal, and therefore, researchers should engage in
distinguishing different qualities of FDI. This is especially hard
because "quality" is a function of many different country and
project characteristics, which are often difficult to measure, and
the data quality is generally poor or available only at an
aggregated level. Second, any effect should be assessed against
the background of the trade-offs, including possible limitations
to the regulatory activity of states, bargaining constraints, and
restrictions to tactical and strategic decisions.
Some of these empirical investigations require extensive
data collection and sorting, complemented with counterfactual
and case studies to determine the value of ICSID in this sphere.
More importantly, by evaluating the contribution of ICSID in
the course of economic development, scholars may succeed in
triggering a deeper conversation and understanding regarding
how law is implicated in the process of the promotion of FDI,
without simply advocating for the replacement of relationship-
specific foreign investment protection. This also will prompt
ICSID to move beyond claiming success based on the aggregated
growth of FDI, which may have almost nothing to do with this
institution and its policies.'
In short, each source of legitimacy stresses a different
function of ICSID, subjecting the institution to a different
assessment and critique as summarized in Table 1. At the same
time, understanding these three sources can substantially
progress and also shift the focus to new empirical investigations
in the field.
CONCLUSION
As more authority is delegated to international institutions,
answering to questions of effectiveness becomes more pressing.
124. ICSI) 2009 REPORT, supra note 102.
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In particular, in this time of economic anxieties, where the
integrity of international economic institutions is questioned, it
is of vital importance to cross-examine such criticism with solid
and grounded empirical research.
Empirical research has substantially progressed in
international law in general and in areas relevant to ICSID in
particular. However, the field is far from settled. This Article has
tried to deconstruct ICSID's goals to provoke deeper
investigations and a shift of focus to new assessments. For the
growing number of legal scholars already engaged with
empirical research about ICSID, investment law and
international dispute settlement, this Article may be seen as a
call for casting the legitimacy debate as one more amenable to
empirical evaluations. It has also sketched some areas where
economic, political science, policy analysis, and other social
sciences researchers can collaborate more fully with
international legal scholars to improve the understanding and
assessment of this complex international organization.
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TABLE 1
Sum mary of ICSID's Goal-Based Perspectives
. . Function &Source Origin netsmnt Critique
A- iessment
- Formal - Corrective - I. R. Realism
processes in justice. (e.g., ICSID is
investor-State instrumental
mode. - Limit the to, and shaped
abuses of by, power.)
- ICSID's diplomatic
delocalized protection by - Critical Legal
system of powerful states. Scholars (e.g.,
mvestment legalization
dispute denies true
settlement ideology.)
(mainly
arbitration.)
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